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COMMENTS ON RICHARD TRUMKA'S WHY LABOR LAW
HAS FAILED
LANCE COMPA*
I share all of Brother Trumka's sentiment and agree with most of his analysis,
but I arrive at a different conclusion. Rather than calling for the abolition of
the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), American working people and their
unions should continue the fight to reform the nation's labor law.
It is tempting to assert that unions should take their chances with common
law, judges, and juries instead of a federal statute and a specialized agency set
up to enforce it. After all, things could hardly get worse. The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) is dominated by anti-labor zealots whose bias against
unions is so pronounced that we, along with most of the labor movement, have
lost nearly all confidence in that body as a recourse for the abuse of workers'
rights.
But I am not convinced that labor unions would fare better at common lav
or before judges and juries. It was precisely the failings of the common law and
strike-breaking injunctions by judges that spurred our labor moyement to seek
protective legislation earlier in this century. I question whether judges and juries
would be more enlightened today, considering the barrge of anti-labor propaganda
on which Americans are raised. The situation in West Virginia might be better,
where unions are more respected and judges are elected. But that is not the case
in many parts of the country, perhaps most.
The political and economic climate of the 1980s is much like that of the
1920s. Without federal labor law, an unregulated test of power between employers
and workers would amount to a struggle between the lion and the lamb. Only
one gets up and burps.
I do not consider it an admission of failure or of weakness to acknowledge
the employers' inherent advantage in a capitalist society. Workers must seek leg-
islative protections in a market economy because the market, left unattended,
works inevitably to their detriment. That is why we have minimum wage laws,
occupational safety and health rules, pension regulation, and the National Labor
Relations Act. Sharp criticisms can be made of each of them, but our challenge
is to reform them, improve them, and enforce them on behalf of workers, not
to abolish them.
* B.A., 1969, Fordham University; J.D., 1973, Yale Law School. The author is the Washington,
D.C. representative of the United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America (U.E.).
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That much being said, I want to rush to agree with Brother Trumka's account
of the workings of the National Labor Relations Board in the administration of
President Ronald Reagan. The NLRB has failed to carry out the explicit national
policy declared in section 1 of the Act: "protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives
of their own choosing," and "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining."' Employers routinely fire workers who lead organizing drives, and
threaten to shut down the workplace or otherwise punish employees for organ-
izing. Where workers stand up to such pressure and vote in favor of union rep-
resentation, employers shift to bad faith bargaining to prevent agreement on a
first contract, then provoke a strike or sponsor decertification moves to get rid
of the union.
All of these actions by employers are unfair labor practices that the law is
designed to remedy. But in the real world, employers scoff at the toothless pen-
alties, take advantage of interminable delays, and deliberately break the law which
allegedly protects the right to organize and bargain.
The temptation is to blame President Reagan and his appointees on the NLRB
for this turn of events. But Brother Trumka rightly points out that the problem
runs much deeper, into the heart of the law itself.
Business Week is hardly a champion of the labor movement, but in 1948 that
publication declared, with remarkable prescience, that "The Taft-Hartley Act went
too far .... Given a few million unemployed in America, given an administration
in Washington which was not pro-union- and the Taft-Hartley Act conceivably
could wreck the labor movement." 2
"Repeal Taft-Hartley" was once a powerful rallying cry in the labor move-
ment. Today it sounds about as compelling as "Who Lost China?" And yet Taft-
Hartley established the legal structure that has squeezed organized labor into its
current tight spot.
The Taft-Hartley amendments to federal labor law came a dozen years after
passage of the Wagner Act, the monumental breakthrough for the American labor
movement. Before the Wagner Act, workers had no legal protection for collective
action. Employers could carry out reprisals against organizers, refuse to bargain,
and refuse to sign an agreement after bargaining. The only recourse for workers
was the strike to obtain recognition, to compel bargaining, to reinstate fired lead-
ers, and to win a written agreement.
The Wagner Act rang out new freedoms to organize and bargain without
fear of discrimination, and charged the NLRB with enforcing the new law. Em-
I National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
2 Why the Taft-Hartley Act Failed, Bus. WK., Dec. 18, 1948, at 124.
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ployers could no longer retaliate against workers trying to organize, and the NLRB
would conduct secret ballot elections to determine majority sentiment. If a ma-
jority of employees chose union representation, the employer had to bargain in
good faith toward a contract.
Millions of workers flocked to the new unions in the John L. Lewis-led Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.), as well as to the older American Fed-
eration of Labor unions. Organized labor's ranks more than tripled between 1935
and 1945, from fewer than four milllon to almost fourteen million members.
But employers, backed by the courts, mounted an assault on the Wagner Act
after World War II. Red-baiting attacks on C.I.O. unions prepared public opinion
for a management offensive. And, militant C.I.O. strikes in 1946 spurred by a
high rate of inflation and disclosures of wartime profiteering fed accusations that
unions had become "Big Labor," rivalling the power of Big Business.
The Taft-Hartley Act put a "right to refrain" from union activity on a par
with the right to organize and bargain. In its key section 8(c), the Act codified
antilabor court decisions allowing employers to campaign openly and agressively
inside the workplace against their own workers who wanted to organize.3
Taft-Hartley also gave the President authority to obtain strike-breaking in-
junctions; 4 established a new class of union unfair labor practices;5 permitted states
where employers maintained a tight grip on government to enact "right-to-work"
laws; 6 outlawed solidarity job actions;7 allowed strikebreakers to vote in NLRB
elections;' let workers bypass union representation to take up grievances individ-
ually; 9 and required loyalty oaths from union officials-a provision later re-
voked, 0 but not before it was used to sow divisions in the labor movement, leading
to the expulsion of unions considered "too radical."
Labor's drive to repeal Taft-Hartley was stifled by the Cold War and by
continuing economic expansion that lulled the movement into a false sense of
security. Unions were firmly entrenched in key industries where they represented
a solid one-third of the workforce. Collective bargaining revolved around how
much could be gained in a new contract. The labor movement was a powerful
player in American politics, winning steady legislative gains in Congress and in
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
4 Id. at § 208, 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1982).
Id. at § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982).
6 Id. at § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1982).
Id. at § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
s Famous Indus. Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 484 (1975); Pacific Tile & Porcelain Co., 137 N.L.R.B.
No. 169 (1962).
9 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
I0 d. at § 9(h), 61 Stat. 146 (Repealed 1959).
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strong labor states. Employers largely accepted unions, even if reluctantly, as part
of the business landscape.
But in the 1970s the economy stopped expanding, and the labor-management
entente came to an end. Labor representation has fallen below one-fifth of the
workforce, strikes are routinely broken, and contracts are going backward more
than forward. The conditions only speculated upon by Business Week in 1948"1
are those that prevail today: millions of unemployed workers desperate for jobs,
and an administration in Washington whose respect for labor rights was best
signalled by its smashing of the air traffic controllers' union. In this context, the
current NLRB is simply carrying out the program that has always been implicit
in the Taft-Hartley Act, namely, breaking the strength of organized labor in the
United States.
Given a choice between jettisoning labor law and engaging in a test of sheer
force with the corporations, on one hand, or seeking labor law reform to restore
the protective shield of federal power, I believe the labor movement must opt
for the latter. Our goal should be a return to the principles of the Wagner Act,
putting the law on the side of workers and their unions.
The principles of the Wagner Act were simple. Questions of organizing, of
bargaining, or taking any form of collective action lay where they belonged: in
the hands of the workers themselves, free from outside interference. The law
recognized a basic fact about capitalist economy: that employers inherently hold
the upper hand in the workplace, based on entrepreneurial control and manage-
ment authority. Accordingly, the law needed to side with workers to right the
balance.
In sum, federal labor law and federal agencies that enforce the law should
be partisan, pro-labor, pro-union, and pro-worker. To build their unions, workers
need the confidence that comes with knowing the government is backing them
up. Obviously, we are a long distance from such a state of events. But we should
redouble our efforts to win labor law reform, not abolition.
The 1986 congressional elections saw the United States Senate shift to a solid
Democratic majority in a clear repudiation of the Reagan program. By now, the
furor surrounding the arms sales to Iran and the illegal diversion of funds to the
Nicaraguan "Contras" has cracked the teflon presidency. More and more, Amer-
ican citizens are becoming fed up with big business abuses and Wall Street scan-
dals.
President Reagan is effectively a lame duck, and a newly assertive Congress
is beginning to move on progressive legislative proposals like national health in-
surance and plant closing protections. There is no reason that labor law reform
1, See Why the Taft-Hartley Act Failed, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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should not return to the top of labor's legislative agenda, especially if a reform-
minded Democrat sweeps into the White House in 1988.
To achieve labor law reform, trade unionists will have to recall significant
lessons of the Wagner Act period. Brother Trumka pointed us in the right di-
rection when he called for labor action in "a world of struggle within the political
and social arenas ... .,,12 While I may disagree with his specific conclusion about
abolishing the Act, Brother Trumka makes a forceful case, and provides an impor-
tant insight, that over-reliance on labor law is a fatal error for trade unionists.
Important as it was, the Wagner Act did not itself liberate workers to begin
organizing. Though the Act was passed in 1935, it did not take effect-and the
newly-created NLRB did not really function-until the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the measure in 1937, in the case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation.3 By that time, workers had already carried out a nationwide
textile strike in 1933, general strikes in San Francisco and Minneapolis in 1934,
sit-down strikes in Akron rubber plants and Toledo auto-light plants in 1935, the
formation of the C.I.O. in 1936, and the 1936-1937 Flint sit-down action that
organized General Motors.
The Wagner Act and the Supreme Court's decision to uphold it actually ra-
tified freedoms that millions of American workers had already claimed in the
shops, mines, mills, and streets. Progressive members of Congress voted for the
bill out of sincere conviction, but others, even President- Franklin Roosevelt and
the Supreme Court majority, were moved more by a fear of uncontrolled industrial
strife. The ongoing strikes and sit-ins meant that employers could not go to sleep
at night certain that their workers would show up in the morning or, if they did,
that they would do any work. For most in Congress and on the Court, the purpose
of the Wagner Act was to restore stability to a shaken system of labor relations.
Still, the Wagner Act cannot be dismissed as an unnecessary sop to workers.
Passage of the Act and approval by the Court electrified working people, em-
boldening them with the feeling that the weight of the federal government was
on their side. The Act spurred the large-scale organizing drives of the C.I.O. and
tough enforcement by the early NLRB helped workers overcome the resistance
of such holdout employers as Ford and Westinghouse. In short, pro-labor laws
encouraged organizing, bargaining and political action, but it took aggressive or-
ganizing, bargaining, and political action to win pro-labor laws.
In today's political and economic climate, workers cannot sit still and wait
for the pendulum to swing back. To force reform of labor law, unions must wage
a new round of strikes, solidarity actions, tough bargaining, aggressive organizing,
and grass-roots political action.
12 Trumka, Why Labor Law Has Failed, 89 W. VA. L. Ray. 881 (1987).
, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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Whenever their unions have been backed to the wall, American workers have
fought back with a burst of militant organizing from the Knights of Labor in
the late nineteenth century to the Wobblies in the early twentieth century and
the C.I.O. in the 1930s. Our labor movement advanced in spurts, not at a steady
pace. It is precisely the kind of talented leadership and aggressive program for
organizing and bargaining that Brother Trumka is bringing to the United Mine
Workers of America (and to the labor movement as a whole) that will constitute
the best lobby for labor law reform.
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